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Resumen:  Uno  de  los  momentos  más  importantes  en  la 




esta  revisión.  Luego,  el  autor  continúa  comentando  y 
evaluando  las  contribuciones  por  capítulos,  así  como  sus 
aportes  científicos.  Finalmente,  se  emiten  las  conclusiones 
que destacan la variedad del texto y su importancia para los 
esfuerzos  futuros  en  el  campo  de  la  filosofía  y  las  ciencias 
política,  y  en un  sentido más  amplio  en  la  educación de  la 
ciudadanía toda. 
Palabras  clave:  democracia;  conocimiento;  epistemología; 
filosofía política. 
Abstract: One of the most critical moments in the education 
of  citizenship  is  literacy  in  political matters.  Regarding  that 
idea  is  that  we  present  this  critical  review  of  the  book 
“Democracy and knowledge.” The author presents in the first 
section  the  general  information  of  the  book.  Then,  he 
continues  commenting  and  evaluating  the  contributions  by 
chapters, as well as their scientific implications. Finally, in the 
conclusions,  it  is  highlighted  the  variety  of  the  text  and  its 
importance  for  future efforts  in the  field of philosophy and 
political science. 
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INTRODUCTION 
t is almost an indisputable truth that the success of a 
symphony is not in the absolute genius of its isolated 
instruments, but in the opus that combines diverse voices in 
a single purpose. 
The book that I have in my hands, Democracy and Knowledge 
(Democracia y Conocimiento in the original), is proof of the 
above. Moreover, I would dare to say that I have it in my 
hands, even if it is not in them now, because it is the sort of 
reading that accompanies us, even after having finished. This 
happens because of three features that I would like to 
highlight in this review: its didacticism, its importance, and 
finally, its theoretical rigor. 
We must start by saying that the work in question has been 
the result of the project "Epistemological innovation: the case 
of biomedical sciences," funded by the Ministry of Science 
and Innovation of Spain. It is part of the consolidated 
research group, funded by the Generalitat de Catalunya, 
"Group of Humanistic Studies of Science and Technology." 
Additionally, it has also been included in the research 
projects "Applied Epistemology" and "Democracy and 
knowledge," funded by the Autonomous University of 
Aguascalientes. 
I want to start by saying, after a careful and detailed reading, 
that Marc Jiménez Rolland has carefully edited the book. 
Consequently, a rigorous correction is evidenced, in the 
appropriate and heterogeneous selection of themes and 
authors and, finally, a sober design that adjusts to the 
simplicity of the proposed objective and allows the careful 
and thoughtful reading of such a complex subject. 
From the organization by chapters, the book consists of 
twelve collaborations between essays and scientific articles. 
To these are added a prologue written by Luis Xavier López 
Farjeat, the epilogue written by Emilio Lledó and an 
introduction entitled, The legitimacy of democracy1, of the 
coordinators, Anna Estany and Mario Gensollen. 
 
1 The translation from Spanish of titles and quotes has been made 
by the Author. 
As its title indicates, throughout its almost 300 pages, the 
fundamental reason for this research has been the inscription 
of democracy in the vast and complex matrix of knowledge. 
Already from the prologue, López Farjeat alerts us about the 
necessary commitment of philosophy in a world that 
increasingly needs its practical intervention. Furthermore, in 
the opinion of the author, this work is located as an 
indisputable example “of how it is possible to think and 
philosophically defend the possible political legitimacy of 
democracy” (p.11). 
For its part, the introduction begins with an invitation to 
think of democracy beyond the famous definition of 
Abraham Lincoln, the government “of the people, by the 
people and for the people.” The problem, we think together 
with the authors, is that this definition brings back another 
series of questions that have to do with its definition, 
justification, values, forms of governments, or merely non-
expressed paradoxes in its most apparent and public form. 
In parallel, and rightly, Estany and Gensollen, define the 
conceptual blocks necessary for the future understanding of 
the forthcoming chapters. Thus, in the first section of the 
introduction, Senses of Democracy, for example, we are 
offered different approaches to the concept studied. This is 
one of the most motivating moments of the book. Though of 
its simplicity, it shows the path that the future reading will 
take, in other words, it gives a short but necessary account of 
the most important ideas that the reader will find along with 
this democratic puzzle. 
That section is followed by The Values of Democracy, where 
the authors discuss the instrumental and intrinsic values of 
that concept. The Reasons of Democracy shows to us that to 
some extent there is a lack of clarity in the reasons we have to 
choose it as the most optimal form of government, therefore, 
“understanding the limits, advantages, and problems 
generated by the democratic method is an unavoidable 
matter of utmost importance ”(p.20). Then, there is 
Dissemination and democratization of Knowledge, and finally 
Perspectives in the Relationship Democracy and Knowledge, 
where it is detailed what the book is about and how it 
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Although not transparent, the reader may find that we can 
group the articles into two sections, at least virtually. In the 
first place, chapters dedicated to the debate on democracy 
itself, or essential aspects for its definition. And in the second, 
a group of collaborations on more specific aspects from the 
cognitive and epistemological point of view. 
FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOS 
TO THE CHINESE INSTANCE 
Paul Luque opens the first group of articles with a question 
that, in the author's opinion, has been overlooked for a long 
time: “How should the demoi be configured?” (p.43). Despite 
this omission, the problem of the constitution of the demos 
(PCD) has gained recently particular importance among 
democracy theorists. There are here two large groups of 
experts. 
On the one hand, those who think about the convenience of 
global and open demos. On the other, those like Sarah Song 
(2012), who argue the instrumental impossibility of that idea, 
and that, consequently, there should be a coincidence 
between the demos and the current states. From this 
crossroads it is that the author, first, reconstructs the debate 
above; and second, he tries to respond to the author's 
arguments, offering reasons to show that her arguments are 
not strong enough to understand the problem. 
Taking as a reference to the definition of democracy 
advanced by Christiano (2015), Alejandro Mosquera, in 
Democracy and negative freedom, begins his article analyzing 
the weight of freedom within the justification of democracy. 
This concept, following Bobbio, finds its legitimacy in the 
freedom understood as autonomy, since this allows to 
eliminate the differences between rulers and governed. 
However, the problem, according to our author, begins with 
the increase of the territory and the number of inhabitants 
associated with other problems that make direct democracy 
an impracticable method. 
Given the complexity of contemporary social and political 
life, “the democracy that is currently possible is 
representative democracy (p. 68),” however, thinks 
Mosquera, it implies a contradiction with the principle of 
freedom as autonomy, understood as a critical principle in 
democratic environments. In this way, we have another 
problem: how to justify representative democracy from the 
concept of freedom? Isn't there a contradiction? The 
response of Mosquera brings us back Rousseau and his idea 
that the individual reaches his true freedom when he 
subordinates his particular interests to the interests of the 
general will. 
Nevertheless, in this new moment, there is a risk that the 
concepts of the general will and freedom in Rousseau may 
drag us towards a paternalistic and monistic democratic 
conception. Then, Mosquera will face this new obstacle 
putting on the table Berlin's argument about negative 
freedom. The author culminates his collaboration with the 
example of the debate about the decriminalization of 
abortion in Mexico. 
Along with freedom and equality, the other vital value to 
justify democracy is fraternity. In this regard, the reader will 
find the article by Àngel Puyol, Fraternity, and democracy in 
contemporary liberalism (with special reference to the work of 
Ronald Dworkin and Véronique Munoz-Dardé). Here the 
author examines the crucial role of fraternity in the political 
legitimization of democracy. He will perform this task taking 
the ideas of Ronald Dworkin, which, in his opinion, are 
“generally little discussed or commented” (p. 84). The 
fundamental idea is that democracy is a political system 
superior to others because it is the one that best realizes the 
political ideal of fraternity. 
By political fraternity, we must understand the political ideal 
in which citizens are related to each other in a way that they 
see each other as equal, in rights and duties, including the 
right and duty of mutual help if necessary. Political systems 
that are not based on equal rights and individual freedoms 
(those that are not democratic) cannot realize the political 
ideal of the fraternity thus understood. The politically 
fraternal link is essential for democracy to obtain actual 
political legitimacy. “Not all democracies are fraternal, but 
the fraternity is only possible in a democracy, and only 
fraternal democracy can achieve true legitimacy” (p. 83). 
Dworkin's work allows us to distinguish between bare 
community and true community. The fraternity corresponds 
to the true community where we can find a conception of 
group responsibilities. These responsibilities, to be 
considered as “genuine fraternal obligation,” must meet 
several conditions. On the other hand, the methodological 
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fraternal politics according to their legitimacy: fraternal 
anarchism, fraternal communitarianism, and fraternal 
contractualism. 
In the next collaboration, Claudia Galindo will begin by 
making a diagnosis of life in the contemporary world, the lack 
of meaning and various crises that not only affect the 
dimension of the individual but also the social sphere. From 
a more essayistic perspective, but without demeriting the 
discursive force of her arguments and the imperative need to 
create some awareness in the readers, this article seeks to 
detail some partial results that she had already reflected in her 
previous work. 
The diagnosis of our present must go through a necessary 
assessment of the state-civil society relation as a whole. Given 
the new problems of meaning, the new media wars, the turn 
to the radical right in Europe and other parts of the world, 
among many other problems, it is necessary to 
reconceptualize the homogeneous character with which we 
understood politics in the past. 
In this way, 
Traditional  conceptualizations,  in  many  cases,  are 
insufficient  in  the  face of  unprecedented  realities.  The 
presence  of  new  actors  and  projects makes  necessary 
and  unavoidable  a  new  design  of  the  logic  of  power, 
which  far  exceeds  the  dimension  of  cohesive,  unitary, 
and homogeneous identity (p. 101). 
Taking this as a reference, Galindo intends to explore what 
she thinks is vital in the task of democratic restoration, the 
notion of an ideal citizen and “the return it represents to a 
concept often forgotten in politics: the fraternity” (p. 103). 
Using Hannah Arendt, the author rethinks modern 
democracies, contrasting the views of the Arendtian political 
ontology with what she calls a “revitalization of the public 
sphere and citizenship” in the case of American politics. 
The author carefully examines the North American case and 
offers us a much more optimistic idea of the debate that is 
currently taking place within that society. “Fortunately, she 
says, what seems to happen in the democracy of the north 
country is a healthy version of a mature, organized civil 
society, which had long retreated to individual life and the 
predominance of consumerism” (p. 110). Beyond optimism, 
we must follow this hypothesis carefully. It is well known that 
not only in politics but in all life, extremes touch each other. 
As a counter-argument, it could be justified that, in the first 
place, it is too early to be able to classify as positive the heated 
debate that takes place within American society; and 
secondly, one would have to enter into a more specific 
analysis of the simplifying, and sometimes even superficial 
ways that such debates take. The latter is especially important 
because this sort of simplicity or lack of complex thinking 
often opposes the fraternity ideal and the well-been of the 
public sphere. 
In any case, the political revitalization project to which we 
have referred still has many challenges ahead, and its guide, 
although problematic, could be made concrete by retaking 
the concept of fraternity. This “gives us the possibility to 
glimpse mechanisms of political innovation beyond a 
probable electoral simplification of democracy” (p. 115). 
Something familiar in several of the texts is the idea that, 
although there is a coincidence in the literature that 
democracy is the best form of government, “it is full of 
imperfections derived from the same definition” (119). In 
this way, given the lack of trust and the problems associated 
with the lack of representation, Victoria Camps in For an 
enlightened democracy proposes the examination of the 
relationship between knowledge, on the one hand, and 
participation of the demos, on the other. 
Given the abrupt incidence of populisms in contemporary 
political life, the cancellation of intelligent demos by partisan 
interests, the increasing demagogic proposals, it should be 
possible, in the author's opinion, to establish a government of 
all citizens who will find: “forms of participation that will give 
governments the essential intelligence to discuss and obtain 
the best decisions” (p.122). 
From here, it is not strange to consider that contemporary 
democracies degenerate not only because of external 
conflicts. Those can also die from an internal process of 
degradation of the institutions and mechanisms that enable 
it. Mario Gensollen and Víctor Hugo Salazar in Democracy 
and sovereignty devote their article to this contradiction. 
The “paradox of democracy” is nothing more than the real 
possibility that any legitimate and correctly constituted 
democracy can, through the force of custom, lack of control 
and surveillance mechanism, corruption, or other means, 
deny itself and elect an undemocratic government. This, 
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becoming more and more common. The formulation of the 
problem has been attributed to Karl Popper2 (2012). 
In this sense, the authors' proposal is aimed at promoting any 
means and mechanisms that allow us to defend the 
democratic commitment. As a result, some mechanisms to 
deal with the aforementioned paradox are listed and 
defended, following the suggestions of Ziblatt and Levitsky 
(2018). However, before that, we need to know the elements 
that can alert us when we are in the presence of a potential 
authoritarian scenario. According to the authors, the 
“determining” role in fighting the “democratic weakness” 
expressed in the Popperian paradox, is played by the political 
opposition. Parties can and should eradicate the extremism 
at the base of their ranks. They can avoid all alliances with 
anti-democratic parties and candidates, and systematically 
isolate, rather than legitimize, the extremist forces. 
Although formally, it can be a guide to be considered, it is 
believed that Ziblatt and Levitsky's proposal does not fully 
satisfy the problem posed. This idea only manifests a new 
paradox; if political parties should play the "determining" 
role, then, who guarantees that the opposition will 
appropriately take the "responsibility" of "cornering" the 
possible undemocratic government? It does not seem very 
wise to grant that “determining” role only to the opposition 
side, when it has been possible to see how the opposition is 
also part of the political game of a specific society and, 
therefore, can also, through their actions, foster the paradox 
of democracy. 
After these conclusions and the partial result of the diagnoses 
applied by other authors, it seems that the text throws us 
more towards the pessimistic hypothesis. That is, although 
democracy has proven effective, not always it has offered the 
epistemological reasons to justify its choice. In this sense, the 
field that deals with how epistemic goods “manifest within 
democracies (a broad and imprecise set of forms of political 
organization)” is often referred to as “democratic 
epistemology” (p. 155). This is the perspective that argues 
 




that, in questions of political philosophy, the correct 
alternative is a democracy. 
In Knowledge and justification in democratic epistemology, 
Marc Jiménez Rolland presents his demonstrations in favor 
of epistemic democracy. His article focuses, on the relevance 
or not of epistemological democracy as a new field that offers 
certain contradictions, but that could help us in 
understanding the democratic process. 
This is done using two theorems; on the one hand, the 
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem and on the other one, the Diversity 
Trumps Ability Theorem, which, apart from its controversial 
conclusions, states that: 
…when selecting a problem‐solving team from a diverse 
population  of  intelligent  agents,  a  team  of  randomly 




the  space  of  problem  solvers.  Their  relatively  greater 
ability is more than offset by their lack of problem‐solving 
diversity.” (Hong & Page, 2004, p.1) 
Thus, Jiménez Rolland, based on the findings above 
mentioned, concludes that democratic epistemology can play 
a role in legitimizing certain forms of collective organization 
that we may call democratic. However, he finishes defining 
the foremost critics on these models and highlights more the 
possibilities than the actual progress of the field. 
In her article, Jürgen Habermas and John Dewey in the face of 
deliberative democracy and the role of scientific knowledge, 
Ana Cuevas brings us back to the classics. This is done to 
respond to the arguments in favor of deliberative democracy. 
Although the thinkers mentioned above tried to analyze and 
solve some of the problems surrounding the concept of 
deliberative democracy, the analysis has not been exhausted. 
One of the original points of this contribution lies in the 
inversion of the historical reading: going first to Habermas 
and then to Dewey. 
he  pays  attention,  the  other  two  being  the  ‘paradox  of 
freedom’ – total freedom leads to suppression of the weak by 
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Despite the similarities in their conceptions of what 
democracy should be, there are also profound differences. 
Although both authors share the emphasis on deliberation 
and dialogue, the main discrepancy between them is 
epistemic, and it has to do with the conception that both 
defend about “truth, scientific knowledge and the search for 
consensus” (pp. 183-184). 
Even though the article leaves us with some expectation for 
more, perhaps motivated by the eloquence and extent of the 
questions posed in the introduction, it gives us at least one 
orientation that reinforces, yes, what has already been said by 
other authors. Here, the radical change has been the 
confluence of democracy with Habermas and Dewey. 
Another aspect that introduces this book has to do with the 
democratization of knowledge. One of the issues that set the 
daily pace in our societies is the importance and relevance of 
the ICT. Anna Estany addresses issues related to that topic in 
Challenges for the democratization of knowledge: the role of 
cognitive design. The objective of her collaboration, in 
particular, is to analyze the main challenges that these 
transformations entail. 
The article explores the consequences of technological 
development and democratic access to new technologies. 
This must be achieved in several ways. There are institutional 
structures that facilitate access to knowledge. Also, there is 
the role that design plays in the construction of technology 
and social organization. And finally, she mentions there are 
cognitive models. The gaps that prevent us from talking 
about more widespread and democratic access to 
technological facilities is related to interdisciplinary and 
collaborative solutions at all levels. The final 
recommendation calls us to continue thinking about this 
problem, due to its multiple edges and possible solutions, 
… The challenge is that access to this technological and 
changing  environment  is  as  universal  as  possible,  an 
objective that affects from macro institutions and social 
structures to the designs of technological products and 
educational,  health  organizations,  business,  etcetera. 
Cognitive models that have emerged in recent decades ‐ 
especially  those  of  third‐generation  cognitive  science, 
which address cognition as located, embodied, extended 
and distributed ‐ constitute a  theoretical  framework  to 
make feasible and save many pitfalls so that knowledge 
reaches all citizens of the world, and thus implement the 
values  of  the  Enlightenment:  freedom,  equality  and 
fraternity”(pp. 222‐223). 
Understanding the mechanisms of democratic negotiation 
from cognitive enactivist models of David Casacuberta, deals, 
as the name implies, with enactivism and the possibility of 
understanding democracy from this theoretical reference. 
Enactivism is a group of theoretical models from which one 
tries to understand cognition. This perspective highlights 
that thinking is not only an exercise that involves the 
processing of formal symbols but, the relational character of 
our knowledge towards the reality that surrounds us and our 
body. This is also linked to the term third generation of 
cognitive sciences, presenting itself as an alternative to both 
the symbolic and connectionist paradigm. 
The originality of Casacuberta's contribution is that this link 
between mind and reality occurs from “the proposal of the 
metaphors of everyday life, developed by cognitive linguists 
Lakoff and Johnson, and that Lakoff has successfully applied 
to understand the negotiation and political processes 
between Republicans and Democrats in the United States” 
(p. 227). 
We think it is vital to point out areas as new as this one, 
because in turn, it indicates how our point of view about a 
correct political action is based, according to the research 
commented by Casacuberta, on a series of experiences that 
are organized “as a moral principle.” Continuing with this 
idea, Lakoff argues that political life is organized partially 
around family metaphors that allude to the father, or society 
as a large family. He also emphasizes that from the enactivist 
model, we can see that knowledge does not work linearly, but 
more like a network. Given the above, this contribution 
allows us to look more closely at a second phenomenon. As a 
result of the dynamics of defending ethical positions from a 
politics based on the experience and the metaphor, we can 
also say that diverse narratives organize the political 
negotiation, and we must think in that as well. 
In his own words, “The party or political position that is 
capable of winning the battle of the story is the one that will 
win a political negotiation or elections, regardless of how 
coherent or functional their specific political proposals are” 
(p. 241). 
During the 1961 trial in Jerusalem to the SS war criminal 
Adolf Eichmann, many were surprised by his statements 
about his Kantian ethical principles during the responses to 
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Vallverdú begins his Kantians Nazi? The ‘homo politicus’ 
from the limited rationality or The banality of Ethics, one of 
the two case studies that close the volume. His proposal 
focuses on the congruence or not between apparent moral 
contradictions; which, in the author's opinion, will serve to 
study the coexistence of moral systems in complex 
environments, both cognitive and social. This, in turn, would 
help to understand and defend a critical vision of democratic 
deontological ethics, which have led to repressive systems 
referring to the “defense of supreme values” (p. 245). 
In the last collaboration of the book, Can we justify liberal 
democracy as a better alternative to Chinese meritocratic 
epistocracy? The author, Armando Cíntora G., wonders if we 
can know if liberal democracy is the best contemporary 
political system or not. The primary motivation of this 
question is the desire to find a minimalist characterization of 
democracy so that it is not confused or unnecessarily 
associated with other positions. Thus, the inevitable plurality 
of contemporary political systems, as well as the variety of 
definitions and problems we have listed above and of which 
we witness daily, legitimately prompts us to ask ourselves, 
which of all democratic alternatives is the best. 
In this article, in addition to delving into the definition of 
what is a liberal democracy, the author defines what the 
illiberal and protected democracies are. In the case of the first 
concept, he emphasizes on the cases of Poland, Turkey, 
Hungary, and Israel. Moreover, among the second group, 
China's political system is the most severe example. After 
focusing on the specific variable of human rights, and its 
discussion in the Chinese context, we come to the partial 
conclusion that, in this case, the human is placed in a second-
place behind the right to development of the whole, which 
may seem contradictory according to western standards.  
However, it is also concluded that we cannot justify as 
rationally superior the hierarchy of values of liberal 
democracies (in particular their priorities for human rights). 
According to the author, “the values priorities of the People's 
Republic of China and its political system are a rational 
alternative, and one that could even lead, as the prosperity of 
its people increases, to a regime closer to the ideal of liberal 
democracies, assuming that China wants to adopt this ideal 
instead of its current ideal (political meritocracy) ”(p. 277).    
 
CONCLUSION 
In general, as the reader has appreciated, the book shows an 
undeniable variety and heterogeneity not only in 
methodological approaches but also in the thematic 
intentions of their authors. 
A possible criticism is that the text is inevitably halfway 
between the reading inscribed in the academic and non-
academic fields. At times the tone is excessively academic for 
an audience with little or no training in political philosophy, 
social sciences or related fields. At other times, the tone is too 
introductory if specific topics that inevitably require 
specialization are taken as a reference. However, the latter, 
more than a determinant factor in the general appreciation of 
this work, it is just an aspect that does not overcome the many 
virtues this book have in terms of political education. 
The book goes to the limit of the democratic, moral, and 
political subjects. Going to the limit, it forces us to inevitably 
think about the unthinkable, and therefore, forces us to 
reconsider the position of critical thinking in current debates 
about democracy. 
As already described, commented, and analyzed above, one 
of the tremendous assets of this reading is the variety of 
questions the book attempts to answer. Among others: Can a 
person be fascist and Kantian at the same time? Is democracy 
a reliable and necessary decision-making method under 
current conditions? Where does it extract its argumentation 
strength, from intrinsic values that self-justify or from 
external values that we must think critically, is there another 
alternative? What influence can new technologies have on 
contemporary political thinking? What knowledge has the 
person to deliberate democratically? How does he or she 
acquire that knowledge? 
If the fundamental reasons for a radical change in our 
perception of democracy are not attained, at least we will 
have sufficient for acting, as Lledó states at his epilogue: “The 
philosopher had explained it centuries ago: no more 
reflections on the meaning of the justice, the good, the right 
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